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Abstract 
 
This paper provides an outlook for the Indian economy in the light of the 
extraordinary global financial crisis, that started in the US, but which has now 
transformed into the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. The 
Indian economy was slowing down even before the onset of global crisis and so the 
timing of this external shock could not have been worse. The analysis undertaken for 
this paper shows that the global crisis is likely to bring the Indian GDP growth rate 
down considerably. This will pose a big challenge requiring urgent and sustained 
policy attention to prevent this downturn from becoming unnecessarily prolonged. 
There is real downside risk that the growth rate could plummet to the pre-1980s levels 
if appropriate countercyclical measures are not taken immediately and are not 
urgently followed by necessary structural reforms. The paper provides a short-term 
forecast for GDP growth based on a model of leading economic indicators. We 
present three scenarios in the paper assuming differentiated impact of the external 
crisis.  Finally the paper suggests a set of policy measures to get the Indian economy 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Researchers in the Macro Unit at ICRIER have been developing the model of leading 
economic indicators to try and forecast India’s GDP growth. The latest results from 
this exercise were published in an early December issue of Business Standard. This 
paper attempts to further extend our GDP forecast until the end of 2009-10 and also 
provides an analysis of recent trends in the Indian macroeconomic situation. The 
structure of the paper is as follows: The next section initially describes the changes in 
India’s external environment. It also examines the nature and intensity of the on-going 
global economic downturn by looking at recent trends in world economic growth, 
global trade and financial flows and the collateral damage that has been caused in 
major emerging economies. Section 3 then provides an analysis of past crises that 
India had undergone and also the recent trends of the Indian economy before and after 
the onset of the global downturn. Section 4 examines the policy response to the 
downturn and points out its strengths and weaknesses. Sections 3 and 4 thus provide 
the context for the growth forecast included in this paper. The penultimate section 
outlines the methodology of the leading economic indicators analysis and provides the 
forecasts for 2008-09 and 2009-10. Finally, section 6 contains policy suggestions for 
India to recover from the current slowdown and resume sustained high and inclusive 
growth in the medium term. 
 
2.  Global Economic Downturn 
 
The extraordinary financial crisis in the US has spread to Europe and Japan and is 
likely to see most developed economies suffering a prolonged period of recession that 
could extend beyond 2009 and according to some even beyond 2010. The financial 
crisis in the US started in the latter half of 2007, with the so-called sub-prime housing 
mortgage crisis. As is by now well established,
1 the crisis had its real roots in hugely 
excessive leveraging by investment and commercial banks, under-pricing of risk and 
lack of necessary regulatory oversight. The busting of some of the big financial 
institutions has created an atmosphere of lack of confidence. This in turn has near 
completely clogged the flow of credit in the system. The banker’s adage that ‘it’s not 
the speed that kills, it’s the sudden stop’ fits the present precarious situation quite 
well. The impasse seen in the credit flow has had a direct impact on investment and 
consumption and has taken a massive toll of the real economy. The morphing of the 
‘Wall Street crisis’ in to a historical ‘Main Street crisis’ has led to the majority of 
OECD economies sliding into deep recession. And it is not yet clear as to when the 
bottom of this recessionary slide will be reached. This causes a further loss of 
confidence. 
 
The enormity of the situation can be sensed by looking at some numbers.  The IMF 
has re-estimated that the losses for financial institutions on account of US-based 
mortgage loans (the so called sub-prime loans) and securities may rise up to US$ 2.2 
trillion (last estimate in October 2008 was US $ 1.4 trillion) [IMF, 2008a and 2009a]. 
The total funds made available by the US government and the Federal Reserve so far 
under the various rescue programs have already amounted to a whopping US$ 7.5 
trillion or more (James Barth, 2008). In addition, the loss of market capitalization can 
                                                 
1 “The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century Part II: June – December, 2008” VOX Book 
February 2009. http://www.voxeu.org/.    2
be gauged from the sharp fall in stock market prices both in mature and emerging 
economies. The loss of wealth this represents is bound to adversely impact global 
demand for a prolonged period. This year in the Forbes list of billionaires the total 
wealth registered was 2.4 trillion U.S. dollars, down from 4.4 trillion last year, 
reducing more than 45 per cent and marking the worst reading since Forbes began 
compiling the list. 
 
Figure 1: World GDP Growth Rates: 1970-2010 
 

































































































       Source:  IMF World Economic Outlook Update, January 2009. 
 
This acute financial crisis resulted in a sharp slowdown of global GDP growth rate 
(Fig. 1). The acuteness, unpredictability and speed of the economic downturn can be 
gauged by the frequent downgrading of forecasts by the IMF. An IMF assessment in 
early November 2008 has projected that the world output would grow by 2.2 per cent 
in 2009 as compared to 3.4 per cent in 2008 and 5.2 per cent in 2007 (IMF, 2008b and 
2009b).  This has been revised in January 2009 to as low as 0.5 per cent and there is 
talk of the global GDP actually contracting in 2009 if major emerging economies are 
unable to compensate for the massive loss of external demand
2.  Projections by the 
IMF in November 2008 for advanced economies had estimated a contraction of 
around 0.3 per cent in 2009. This has been revised downwards in January 2009 to 
around 2.0 per cent.  This is the first annual contraction for developed economies 
taken together since World War II. The World Bank had projected in early December 
2008 that world trade will contract by 2.1 per cent in 2009, the first time since 1982 
(World Bank, 2009).  The IMF in January 2009 has revised it downwards to 2.8 per 
cent.  The decline in exports in some major economies in the third and fourth quarters 
of 2008 has been simply stunning. In January 2009, exports fell sharply in Japan by 
46.3 per cent, in Germany by 20.7 per cent, China by 17.5 per cent, in India by 15.9 
per cent and in UK by 6.7 per cent. 
 
                                                 
2 IMF Managing Director, Strauss Kahn has indicated that IMF is expected to further revise the global 
growth for 2009 to subzero in its World Economic Outlook to be released in April 2009.   3
Figure 2:  Global Trade, 1981-2008 
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While some major emerging economies like China and India escaped the negative 
impact of the financial meltdown on their banking sector, any hopes that their real 
economies have decoupled from the developed market economies have been quickly 
belied. These economies are now experiencing a sharp downturn in their GDP growth 
rates. The IMF in January 2009 lowered its projections of GDP growth in 2009 for 
both India and China to 5.1 and 6.7 per cent respectively. This is a sharp slowdown in 
GDP growth for both these giant emerging economies compared to the past five years.  
 
The contagion of this financial crisis has now spread to countries in Asia as the export 
markets of these countries have virtually collapsed. Exports in major Asian economies 
have declined by huge amounts. Japan and Taiwan saw a fall in exports of around 35 
per cent and 40 per cent respectively in their exports in December 2008. The fallout 
from a major slowdown in Chinese exports and its GDP growth on South East 
economies and indeed the rest of the world can be severe and has yet to be factored in 
to the estimates of global growth for 2009 and 2010. Along with exports, industries in 
the region have also been affected as can be seen in the shocking contraction of 
Taiwan’s industrial production of around 32 per cent in December 2008. The severity 
of the economic downturn has shocked all observers and the end is not yet in sight. 
The latest forecast by Nouriel Roubini, the NYU professor, who had warned of the 
crisis ahead of all others, is that world GDP will start to recover only toward the end 
of 2010. Thus, we have to reckon with another two years of weak global economic 
activity and perhaps a further shrinking of world trade.
3 
 
The scale of this global financial crisis and the subsequent economic downturn across 
the world has made it one of the truly global crises that the world has ever seen. But 
the pattern and the characteristics of the crisis expectedly have some precedence. In 
an influential study on the scale and duration of financial crises, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008) found that financial crises are protracted episodes and the asset market 
collapses due to them are deep and prolonged.  Many of the financial crises have been 
                                                 
3 Nouriel Roubini speaking at the India Today Conclave in New Delhi on 6
th March, 2009. See also 
http://www.rgemonitor.com/. 
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seen to be preceded by bubbles in the housing market and huge bullish rally in the 
stock markets. In their study they found that on an average real housing prices 
declined by 35 per cent over six years and the stock prices collapses average around 
55 per cent recovering back to normal in more than three years. Apart from the impact 
on asset classes they found that the crises have huge impacts on the real economy as 
well. In terms of unemployment they found that the average slump to be around 7 per 
cent with recovery normally seen in four years. In regard to real GDP per capita they 
found that the contraction on average is around 9 per cent with an average two year 
recovery period.  These results are important to note both for getting some 
understanding of how the global economic downturn might unfold in the coming 
months and also for understanding the impact of the crisis on the future outlook for 
the Indian economy.   
 
3.  Indian Economy: Past Crises and Recent Developments 
 
3.1  Past Crises 
 
Using an averaging process of past crises as done in the seminal study of Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008) we try to see the impact of the present global crisis on the nature, 
severity and duration of the economic downturn in India. The past crises that have 
been considered are the three major crises – 1991-92 balance of payment (BOP) 
crisis; 1997-98 fallout from the Asian financial crisis; and 2000-02 crisis caused by 
the worldwide bursting of the dotcom bubble and 9/11 incident. 
 
Figure 3:  Indian GDP Growth Trends 
 














































































       Source: Central Statistical Organization. 
 
Quite expectedly, the sequencing of the crisis and the transmission mechanism are 
different in developed and developing economies. In the developed world the crisis 
originated in the financial sector and then impacted the real economy. The Swedish 
and Norwegian crises of the nineties and the present crisis in the US followed this 
sequence. For developing economies in the current crisis the causality and sequencing 
generally runs the other way, with the real sector being hit first and the financial 
sector thereafter. The pattern was of course different in the Asian financial crisis of 
the later nineties when the crisis also originated in the financial sectors of Asian 
economies.  In line with this trend, in each of the cases of external shock, the real   5
sector of the Indian economy has been initially impacted by the crisis as its banks are 
considered safe and robust
4. Exports and foreign trade overall have been the first to be 
impacted and act as the channel for the external crisis to be transmitted to the Indian 
economy.  
 
The chart below shows the average of annual exports growth rates during the three 
major crises that India has suffered since the end of eighties. The period selected is 
three years prior to and three years after the worst year of the crisis. In the past crises 
we find that export growth slumped by 12 percentage points during the crises period. 
But the export sector recovered in just one year after the slump in all the three major 
crises. The sudden recovery of exports can be due to the huge depreciation that is seen 
during the crises period. 
 
Figure 4:  Indian Exports and Imports Crises Average 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
On the other hand if we look at the imports we find that the slump is for a longer 
duration. As can be seen from Fig. 4b, import growth starts falling two years prior to 
the crises. The fall in import growth in the three major crises is greater than the fall 
seen in export growth. Import growth fell at an average of 14 percentage points and 
recovery also takes longer than for exports. The sharp depreciation during the crisis 
period makes the imports more expensive, hence, leading to their prolonged slump. 
The recovery in the case of imports is longer of a period of two years as compared to 
just one year in the case of exports. During the present crisis, the growth in exports 
and imports has started declining in September and October 2008 respectively. 
 
In the earlier crises the manufacturing sector also was negatively impacted. For 
example during the BOP crisis of 1991-92, the index of industrial production (IIP) 
grew at just 0.6 per cent. Industrial production has also weakened during the present 
downturn. IIP growth for the period, October to December 2008, averaged 0.4 per 
cent. In the month of January 2009, IIP registered a negative growth of around -0.5 
per cent. As can be seen from the average of past crises, IIP growth in the peak year 
of the crises has fallen by an average of 3 percentage points, year on year (Fig. 5a). In  
 
                                                 
4 Indian banks did not have any direct exposure to mortgage-based securities, their off- sheet activities 
were quite limited and nothing of the sort of securitization that was seen in the US was present here.   6
the present global downturn, manufacturing has virtually collapsed.
5 In India’s case it 
is not yet clear if the trough of the industrial cycle has been reached and hence it is 
difficult to forecast the trend for the recovery. 
 
Figure 5:  IIP and GDP Crises Average 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India 
 
Finally, in the case GDP growth we find it falling by about 3 percentage points during 
the peak crises year (Fig. 5b). 
 
3.2  Indian Economy: Recent Developments 
 
India had been growing robustly at an annual average rate of 8.8 per cent for the past 
five years (2003-04 to 2007-08). This was higher than the potential growth rate of 
output as estimated both by the IMF and OECD (See IMF, 2007 and OECD, 2007). 
The strong Indian growth story, based on its structural strengths of a young 
population, skilled manpower, rising savings and investment rates, large unfulfilled 
domestic demand and globally competitive firms attracted significant investor 
attention in recent years. Analysts have predicted that by the year 2025, India would 
be the third largest economy in the world after China and the US. Recent high rates of 
economic growth have been the result of high levels of investment, rise in 
productivity supported by technological up-gradation and greater integration with 
global flows of trade, finance and technology. The challenge is to sustain these high 
growth rates while also preventing an unacceptable rise in income and spatial 
inequities and also eliminating absolute poverty in a given time frame. The answer to 
this challenge is in raising India’s potential rate of output growth by removing the 
binding constraints. We have also estimated the potential growth rate for India during 
the last decade based on HP filter technique (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) and found 





                                                 
5 Industrial production in the US and UK fell sharply in the latest three months (November 2008-
January 2009) by 3.6 per cent and 4.4 per cent respectively (equivalent to annual declines of 13.8 per 
cent and 16.4 per cent). Germany’s industrial production in the fourth quarter of 2008 fell by 6.8 per 
cent; Taiwan’s by a whopping 21.7 per cent and of Japan’s by 12 per cent 
 (The Economist, 2009).   7
 
 















Note: Based on HP filter technique as proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997). 
 
Fears of over-heating of the economy prompted the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to 
begin monetary tightening as early as September 2004 when the cash-reserve ratio 
(CRR) for commercial banks was raised.  The sharp increase in global fuel and food 
prices in the first quarter of 2008 aggravated inflationary concerns and resulted in 
further monetary tightening that saw interest rates being hiked until August 2008. 
This was clearly a case of policy running behind the curve and consequently over- 
compensating in its attempt to weaken inflationary expectations.  Expectedly, this 
amount of monetary contraction resulted in a slowing down of the economy with the 
GDP growth coming down to 7.8 per cent during April-September 2008 from 9.3 per 
cent in the same period of 2007. 
 
The global financial sector meltdown precipitated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008 and the subsequent virtual nationalization of AIG, the world 
largest insurance company, impacted India at a time when the economy was already 
in the midst of a cyclical slowdown. The immediate transmission of the financial 
crisis to India was through a cessation of credit flows which was reflected in the 
spiking of overnight call money rates that rose to nearly 20 per cent in October and 
early November 2008 (See Fig. 7). Spooked by market rumors and some 
circumstantial evidence, depositors sought safety by shifting their deposits away from 
private banks to large public sector banks as reflected in the State Bank of India (SBI) 
seeing an increase in deposits of more than Rs. 1000 crore per day during that period. 
Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) withdrew from the Indian markets to provide the 
much-needed liquidity to their parents in the US or Europe. This resulted in a net 
repatriation of about $ 13 billion by the FIIs in 2008 on account of equity 
disinvestment though small has resulted in a sharp decline in equity prices and market 
capitalization. Besides, there had been large-scale redemption of holdings with mutual 
funds which put further pressure on liquidity. Thus, while the Indian banking sector 
remained largely unscathed by the global financial crisis, it could not escape a 
liquidity crisis and a credit crunch. This in turn has had its impact on investment and 
consumption and the real economy. 
   8
Figure 7:  Daily Call Money Rates 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
Thus, the present global crisis has already begun affecting the Indian economy. With 
the sharp fall in oil and other commodity prices, inflation fears have receded. The 
year- on-year inflation rate has already come down to 2.4 per cent in the week ended 
28
th February 2009 from the peak of 12.9 per cent for the week ended 2
nd August 
2008. This does not fully reflect the actual softening of prices in the last few months, 
which is better seen by looking at month-on-month price changes (See in the next 
section). The significant decline in prices is worth noting as it presents policy options 




The rate at which inflation has been sliding coupled with high base effect in the 
coming weeks provides quite a reasonable possibility of negative inflation. Apart 
from the year-to-year inflation if we take into consideration the month-to-month and 
quarter-to-quarter inflation, WPI inflation is already in negative territory. The rate at 
which inflation has been sliding has been sharp. If we try to follow this through a 
polynomial trend line, we find that the trend line has an inverted U shape (Fig. 8). The 
WPI index for the last week of February 2009 stood at 227.7. If we extend the trend 
line for another four weeks, i.e., up to end-March, we find that the index reduces to 
225. This compared to last year would lead to a negative inflation rate. And even if 
we keep the price index constant at the present level of 227.7 then also in the second 
week of April we can expect negative inflation. 
 
Moreover, there are several factors that point towards a continued sliding of prices in 
the coming months. Both global and domestic demand for commodities is likely to 
remain weak in the coming months. The services and manufacturing sector are faced 
with unutilized capacities and so a price rise is most unlikely to happen. In fact, there 
is a danger today of deflationary situation arising in the economy. 
 
But what about growth? All signs point to a further and perhaps a sharper slowing 
down of the economy in the second half of 2008-09 fiscal year. The index of 
   9














































































































Possibility of Zero Percent WPI Inflation 
 
Source: Office of Economic Advisor, Ministry of Commerce &Industry, Government of India. 
 
industrial production (IIP) registered a negative growth (a decline in production 
levels) in December 2008, for the first time since April 1994 and again in January 
2009. Exports which had grown by 29 per cent in 2007-08 and 29.5 per cent in the 
first half of 2008-09 have shown negative growth from October onwards. In this 
context of a severe external shock brought about by the on going global recession, this 
paper examines the growth prospects of India for 2008-09 and 2009-10. It also looks 
at the policy challenges facing the government in protecting the economy from the 
global recessionary contagion and attempting to achieve sustained high growth with 
low inflation over the medium term. 
 
4.  Causes of the Slowdown in 2008-09 
 
4.1  Impact of Monetary Tightening 
 
Price stability, strongly anchoring inflationary expectations, promoting growth and 
maintaining financial stability are the avowed objectives of Indian monetary policy. 
The tolerance limit for the purposes of monetary policy for inflation in India is 
considered to be at about 5 per cent. Inflation in India has been at moderate levels as 
compared to other emerging economies but during 2003-04 the wholesale price index 
(WPI) inflation crossed the 6 per cent mark (Fig. 9).  
 









































































































CPI inflation(Industrial Workers) 
 
Source: Office of Economic Advisor, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government  
of India.   10
 
In response to the rise in inflation, the RBI, with its hawkish stance on inflation, and 
faced with an overheating economy, started monetary policy tightening as early as 
September 2004 when the CRR was raised from 4.5 to 5 per cent in two steps. As the 
inflationary situation worsened in the subsequent period the tightening got harder as 
shown in Fig. 9. With headline inflation crossing double digits first time in the second 
week of June 2008 and reaching 11 per cent primarily due to the abnormal hike in 
global fuel, food and commodity prices, the RBI continued with further monetary 
tightening. The last set of measures to cool the economy were announced at the end of 
August 2008. The RBI, ostensibly in response to global oil prices crossing $147 per 
barrel and domestic year-on-year inflation reaching 12.9 per cent raised the CRR by 
25 basis points to 9 per cent. As several critics pointed out, the tight monetary policy 
stance was provoked principally to compensate for the fiscal expansion that originated 
with the 2008-09 budget. But the RBI perhaps overlooked that price trends, as 
reflected in the month-on-month changes had begun to head southwards since end of 
September 2008. The economy had already slowed down before the onset of the 
global crisis on account of the measures taken since the latter half of 2004.  
 


























































































































































































Reverse repo rate Repo rate Cash Reserve Ratio
 
           Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
The effects of monetary policy are subject to long lags and the full impact of the 
progressive tightening that continued until August 2008 is still to fully work itself out. 
However, the contractionary impulses generated by the tightening undertaken until 
August 2008 are now being countered by the expansionary impact of monetary policy 
relaxation that started in the latter half of October 2008. 
 
4.2  Industrial Sector Weakness 
 
Fig. 11 plots the 12-monthly moving average of growth rates in the index of industrial 
production (IIP) from September 1982. This shows that industrial growth is 
characterized by prolonged periods of downturns. We had two previous downturns 
since the early 1980s: the first one in the early 1990s lasting 33 months and the 
second one since the mid-nineties lasting a longer 71 months. The first downtrend that 
happened in the early 1990s was on the back of the external payment crisis whereas 
the second downtrend coincided with the East Asian crisis.  The recent downturn 
started since May 2007 and by December 2008 has already run for 20 months was   11
preceded by the longest upward industrial cycle during which the IIP growth rate 
improved almost continuously for 64 months. Underlying the beginning of the 
slowdown is the hardening of interest rates since March 2007 in the wake of the 
tightening monetary policy. The second quarter year-on-year IIP growth in the current 
year (Q2 2008-09) has dropped to 4.7 per cent from 5.3 per cent in the first quarter. In 
Q3 2008-09, the growth rate had turned to just 0.4 per cent. In January 2009 the 
growth rate turned negative at -0.5 per cent. The downturn is turning severe and 
would be prolonged due to the global crisis. 
 
Figure 11:  12
 Month Moving Average of IIP (1982-2008) 
 
 
               Source: Central Statistical Organization. 
 
4.3  Monsoon-dependent Agriculture 
 
In India agricultural growth closely follows monsoon.  This is illustrated in Fig. 12 
which gives the relationship between agricultural GDP growth and the deviation of 
rainfall from normal. It can be seen that monsoon deviations have a major impact on 
agricultural output.  Except a few years in the late seventies and mid-nineties, the 
relationship holds up quite strongly. 
 

















    Source: Department of Agriculture & Cooperation, Government of India. 
   12
However, agriculture performance depends not only on the average level monsoon but 
also on its temporal and spatial distribution. During the current year, the cumulative 
rainfall during the south-west monsoon was normal or excess in 34 of total 36 sub-
divisions, its distribution has been uneven and as a result, the areas sown in the kharif 
season for coarse cereals, pulses, sugarcane, cotton and jute have been lower than last 
year. There were excess rains towards the end of south-west monsoon which has 
increased the moisture levels in the soil and that was considered good for the rabi 
crop. According to official crop-weather watch reports, there have been increases in 
area sown under various crops in the rabi season.  
 
The second advance estimates of food crops and cash crops released by the 
Department of Agriculture and Cooperation in February 2009 show a marginal 
decline in production of total food grains and a substantial decline in production of all 
major cash crops in 2008-09 compared to the previous year (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Estimates of Foodgrains and Commercial Crops for 2008-09 (Lakh tones) 
 















Total nine oilseeds 
Cotton (lakh bales) 







































Source: Department of Agriculture & Cooperation, Government of India. 
 
4.4  Investment Weakness 
 
The major drivers of India’s high growth rate in the last five years have been 
investment and private consumption. As can be seen from Fig. 13, the rate of growth 
in gross fixed investment more than doubled from about 7 per cent during 2001-03 to 
about 16 per cent during 2003-07. Growth in private final consumption also rose from 
about 5 per cent during 2001-05 to about 8 per cent during 2005-07. Private 
consumption growth has slowed down since Q3 2007-08, and the growth in fixed 
investment has continuously fallen since Q2 2007-08 with some pick-up just in Q2 
2008-09. Government final consumption expenditure which normally is subject to 
wide swings has shown some reasonable growth in recent quarters and substantially 
so in Q3 2008-09. 
 
The financial crisis in the US and the consequent recession in major developed 
countries have altered investment sentiments in India. The investment weakness 
which had already begun in India in the second half of 2007-08 has further worsened   13
with the global crisis. The  impact of global crisis on both consumption and 
investment is clearly seen in Q3 of 2008-09 (Fig. 13). 
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       Source: Central Statistical Organization. 
 
4.5  Fiscal Measures 
 
Fig. 14 provides a synoptic view of fiscal trends from 1990-91, the year in which 
India confronted its gravest economic crisis. There has been a steady improvement in 
central and state finances since 2001-02 when the fiscal and revenue deficits of the 
combined central and state governments reached a peak of 9.9 per cent and 7.0 per 
cent of GDP respectively. 
 
 






















Fiscal Deficit 9.4 6.5 9.5 9.9 9.6 8.5 7.5 6.7 5.6 5.3 4.6
Revenue Deficit 4.2 3.2 6.6 7.0 6.6 5.8 3.6 2.8 1.3 0.9 0.5
Interest payments 4.4 4.9 5.9 6.2 6.5 6.4 6.2 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.4






     Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
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There was some deterioration in the central government finances in 2005-06 but these 
improved in 2006-07. The fiscal consolidation by the states has also been quite 
significant in recent years.  
 
The central government budget for the current year 2008-09 targeted a further 
improvement in the fiscal situation. However, several leading experts and economists 
have conclusively pointed out the gross underestimation of fiscal deficit in that 
budget. The Interim Budget, released in February 2009,  has now revealed a huge rise 
in fiscal deficit of the central government to 6 per cent of GDP in 2008-09 from 2.7 
per cent in 2007-08.  
 
The table below summarizes the budgetary trends as presented in the Interim Budget 
2009-10. The worsening of fiscal deficit in 2008-09 (revised estimates) from the 
budget estimates is due to an increase in expenditure of Rs. 150,069 crore (2.8 per 
cent of GDP) and a decline in revenue receipts of Rs. 40,762 crore (0.75 per cent of 
GDP). The fiscal burden arising from fiscal stimulus packages (including both 
revenue fall and expenditure increase) amounted to Rs. 40,700 crore constituting just 
0.75 per cent of GDP. Thus, out of the deterioration of fiscal deficit of 3.5 per cent of 
GDP from the budget estimates, the bulk of it, i.e., 2.8 per cent of GDP has not been 
due to fiscal stimulus packages. 
 
Table 2:  Central Government Budget 2009-10 (Rs. Crore) 
 
   2007-08 
(Actuals)   
2008-
09 
(BE)     
2008-
09 
(RE)     
2009-
10 
(BE)     
%Change   
4 over 2 
%Change   
5 over 4 
1 2  3  4  5  6  7 
1.  Revenue Receipts 
(3+4) 
541925  602935 562173 609551  3.7  8.4 
2.  Gross Tax Revenue  593147  687715  627949  671293  5.9  6.9 
       Corporation tax  192910  226361  222000  244200  15.1  10.0 
       Income tax  102644  120604  108000  118800  5.2  10.0 
       Customs  104119  118930  108000  110187  3.7  2.0 
       Excise duties  123611  137874  108359  110604  -12.3  2.1 
       Service tax  51300  64460  65000  68900  26.7  6.0 
3.  Net Tax Revenue (Net 
of States' Share) 
439547  507150 465970 497596  6.0  6.8 
4.  Non-Tax revenue  102378  95785  96203  111955  -6.0  16.4 
5.  Recoveries of Loans  5100  4497  9698  9725  90.2  0.3 
6.  Other Receipts*  3264  10165  2567  1120  -21.4  -56.4 
7.  Total Expenditure*  677201  750884  900953  953231  33.0  5.8 
8.  Revenue  Expenditure  594494  658119  803446  848085  35.1  5.6 
      Of which: Interest 
payments 
171030  190807 192694 225511  12.7  17.0 
9.  Capital Expenditure*  82707  92765  97507  105146  17.9  7.8 




241273   
(4.4) 
238534   
(4.0) 
359.0 1.1 
11. Fiscal Deficit [7- 
(1+5+6)] 
126912     
(2.7) 
133287   
(2.5) 
326515   
(6.0) 




*Excludes transactions related to RBI transfer of State Bank of India to central government in 2007-08 (Rs. 
35531 crore) which is deficit neutral as equivalent amounts are shown on both receipts and expenditure sides.  
Note: Figures in brackets are per cent to GDP. 
 
 
Source: Budget Documents, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.   15
 
The above estimates do not take into account the off-budget items of oil and fertilizer 
bonds which are estimated at Rs. 95,942 crore, equivalent to 1.8 per cent of GDP. For 
the previous year 2007-08 this amounted to Rs. 19,453 crore or 0.4 per cent of GDP. 
Thus including these off-budget items, the centre’s fiscal deficit in 2008-09 would be 
7.8 per cent of GDP compared to 3.1 per cent of GDP in 2007-08, a more than 
doubling of the deficit and largely, it can be argued, on account of electoral 
considerations as it was generated prior to the eruption of the global crisis in 
September 2008. The consolidated fiscal deficit of the states is expected to be over 3 
per cent of GDP in 2008-09 against the budget estimates of 2.1 percent.  Taking into 
account the additional borrowing of Rs. 30,000 crore for the fiscal stimulus package 
and the likely shortfall in tax revenues, the combined overall fiscal deficit would be 
about 11 per cent of GDP in 2008-09 as against 5.4 per cent in 2007-08. 
 
Is High Deficit a Problem? 
 
This high fiscal deficit marks a sharp reversal of fiscal consolidation happening over 
the last 6 years. It is a matter of concern as the Indian experience shows that high 
fiscal deficit hurts economic growth (Fig. 15).  
 
Figure 15:  Fiscal Deficits and GDP Growth (1981-2 to 2007-8) 
 
      Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
The RBI (2001) has done significant research on the role of fiscal policy in reviving 
the Indian economy.
6  The results of the research show that attempts to raise public 
sector consumption to revive aggregate demand crowd out both private consumption 
and investment with no long-run impact on output. On the other hand, government 
                                                 
6 This research looked at the impact not only the quantum of overall government spending but also the 
composition of government spending. Earlier studies on India had indicated the differential impact of 
the different components of government expenditure on private sector and the RBI has pursued it 
further with the data for the period 1972-73 to 1999-00. This shows that (i) government consumption 
expenditure leads to a decline in private consumption; (ii) public sector investment in manufacturing 
has a negative effect on private investment; and (iii) public sector investment in infrastructure has a 
positive effect on private investment. In addition, it shows that while government infrastructure 
investment encourages private investment, it may well, at the same time increase the fiscal deficit, 
which in turn could adversely affect the private investment. The study estimates an elasticity 
coefficient of minus 0.3 for fiscal deficit on private investment.    16
expenditure on infrastructure investment crowds in private investment; and public 
investment in manufacturing adversely affects private investment. In addition, the 
level of fiscal deficit is also seen to be important as the positive impact of public 
sector infrastructure investment on private investment is predicated on the deficit 




With the fiscal deficit estimated to be above 10 per cent of GDP in 2008-09, the ratio 
of public debt to GDP is set to exceed 87 per cent of GDP at the end of the year. This 
is likely to rise further in 2009-10 as preliminary estimates for the fiscal deficit for the 
next fiscal year are also above 10 percent and could be higher if the GDP growth 
slows down further. This will reverse the downward movement in the public debt to 






























Centre 55.2 50.9 55.6 60.0 63.5 63.0 63.3 63.1 61.2 61.5 57.7
States 22.5 20.9 28.3 30.3 32.0 33.2 32.7 32.6 30.2 28.3 27.4
Combined  64.7 61.0 70.6 76.0 80.3 81.4 81.3 80.4 77.0 76.9 73.4






           Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
But what is the sustainable level of public debt ratio for India? The Twelfth Finance 
Commission had set this ratio to a target level of around 55 per cent in 2004-05, 
which was not achieved. Internationally, the Maastricht Treaty had set the tolerable 
debt level to around 60 per cent of GDP for the European Union countries. However, 
finding a particular threshold level for public debt to GDP would not be that feasible. 
In one of the seminal studies on the debt tolerance of countries (Reinhart et al, 2003) 
found inter alia that countries that were to default had higher aggregate public debt to 
GDP ratio and higher share  of external debt in the total public debt than non-
defaulters (IMF, 2003). India has one major advantage of having a very low share of 
                                                 
7 In 2003-04 the total public debt to GDP ratio in India had been 81.4 per cent of GDP. It moved down 
gradually to below 77 per cent in 2007-08 and was budgeted to go down further to 73.4 per cent of 
GDP in 2008-09.   17
external debt in total public debt at less than 5 per cent.  While this is a silver lining, 
letting the total public debt to go far beyond the levels  recommended by the Twelfth 
Finance Commission or the Maastricht Criteria will be problematic. 
8 
 
The government introduced fiscal stimulus packages amounting to 1.3 per cent of 
GDP in 2008-09 which has worsened the already high fiscal deficit situation. The 
additional borrowing to finance the huge deficit has already raised yields on 
government bonds in the last few months of the year. At a time of low private sector 
demand, we find the possibility of government borrowing crowding out the private 
sector borrowing. Standard and Poor’s downgrade of India in February 2009 to a 
negative territory of lowest investment grade also points to the lack of fiscal space. 
The argument for crowding out is particularly relevant for India also due to lack of an 
active government bond market. The burden of fiscal profligacy falls initially on the 
banks who will try to pass on this burden to the private sector by raising its cost of 
borrowing. This implies that there is not much fiscal headroom for India in 
stimulating domestic demand. This is a pity as monetary measures need to be 
supplemented by fiscal expansion for counter-cyclical measures to become effective. 
This is especially true in a downturn when the consumption propensity is likely to 
decline and the monetary multiplier is weak. 
 
4.6  Global Integration 
 
Indian economy has become much more integrated with the world economy now than 
the pre-reform period. Liberalization in industry, investment, foreign trade, financial 
sector and capital flows that was undertaken after the balance of payment crisis in 
early 1990s led to India becoming well integrated with the world economy. Total 
trade flows (receipts and payments on merchandise and invisibles), as a proportion of 
GDP, rose from 20 per cent to 53 per cent during the period 1990-91 to 2007-08 (Fig. 
17). Capital flows (inflows plus outflows) had been just 12 per cent of GDP in 1990-
91, and in 2007-08 they rose to 64 per cent of GDP. Interestingly, these ratios are 
significantly higher than those in the US for which in 2007 trade in goods and 
services constituted a lower 41 per cent of GDP and capital flows were only 25 per 
cent of the GDP in that year. 
 
                                                 
8 While it is to difficult to indicate the ideal size of public debt, what one can say is that it will be 
problematic if the ratio of debt to GDP rises year after year. The basic rule is that the ratio of debt to 
GDP will keep rising if there is a primary deficit (i.e. fiscal deficit minus interest payments) or if the 
interest rate of debt exceeds the growth rate of GDP. For the Indian economy, Rangarajan and 
Srivastava (2005) has found that for the period 1951-2003, primary deficit was the core variable that 
led to increase in debt to GDP ratio. The public debt to GDP ratio in the beginning of the first Plan 
period (1950-51) was around 29.6 per cent which had risen to 75.9 per cent in 2002-03. However, 
even with a primary deficit for a long period of time, the debt to GDP ratio was contained in certain 
periods due to the faster growth of GDP as compared to the real interest rates. Rangarajan (2003) had 
found that during the 1970’s and 1990’s, negligible increase was seen in the debt-GDP ratio because 
nearly 100 per cent of the impact of the primary deficit was absorbed by the growth-interest 
differential. If we try to evaluate the soundness of the Indian economy through these parameters the 
picture is some what mixed. The positive factor is that we have been running a primary surplus since 
2006-07 and 2008-09 budget estimates had indicated a rather low level of primary deficit of around 
0.8 per cent of GDP. However, with the huge rise in actual fiscal deficit, there would be a primary 
deficit of the order of 5 per cent of GDP and more in 2008-09. As regards the growth-interest 
differential there may be concern as the GDP growth rate would come down sharply in the coming 
years and interest rates may come down only with a lag.    18


















          Source: Reserve Bank of India 
 
With the increased linkage with the world economy, India cannot remain immune to 
the global crisis. India began to feel the impact of the crisis in January 2008 when the 
BSE sensex collapsed after crossing the peak of 20800 in early January 2008. 
Basically there are three channels through which India is affected by the global crisis: 
(i) financial markets, (ii) trade and (iii) exchange rate. 
 
The financial channel has been operating in India largely through the equity or 
portfolio flows. The outstanding FII equity investments at the end of December 2007 
had been about US$ 66 billion and by 13th March 2009 they have fallen to US$ 51 
billion. This is due to the US and European financial institutions which are 
undergoing a historically unprecedented “deleveraging” process.  The IMF has 
estimated that the US and the European banks alone are to downsize their assets by 
about US$ 10 trillion in 2009. This will involve massive disinvestment from the 
emerging markets continuing this year. FII equity outflows are just one part of 
outflows from India. Indian banks and corporates have been unable to borrow from 
abroad as there is a complete freeze of the financial system in the US and Europe. 
Instead, they had to send funds from India to provide for the necessary liquidity in 
their operations abroad as foreign banks were unable to meet their requirements. 
Moreover, trade financing by foreign banks also practically dried up and Indian banks 
had to substitute for that as well. With the crashing of global and domestic stock 
markets, the primary issue market also dried up in India.  All this led to a huge 
liquidity and credit squeeze in India during September-October 2008.  
 
The trade channel has worked negatively with the collapse of global demand for 
Indian exports, both merchandise and services. As a result, growth in India’s exports 
slowed down sharply in September 2008 and turned negative from October onwards. 
Merchandize exports have been growing at 29 per cent till September 2008. Software 
exports grew by 22 per cent in H1 2008-09 and remittances by 49 per cent. They are 
likely to experience sharp declines in the second half for which data is not yet   19
available. A 10 per cent decline in the growth of export of goods and services could 
bring down the GDP growth significantly. 
 
A comparison with China will be interesting in this regard. Table 3 gives the structure 
of demand for the economy of India and China for the year 2006. With very low 
consumption ratio and high import ratio, the income multiplier for China is lower than 
that in India. Therefore, though export ratio in China is much higher at 40 per cent 
than that of India at 23 per cent, the contribution of exports to GDP may not be much 
lower in India in comparison with China.
9 Rough calculations indicate that a 10 per 
cent rise in exports can raise the GDP by 4 per cent in China, whereas in India it is 
likely to increase the GDP by as much as 3 per cent. 
 
 
Table 3: Structure of Demand 2006: India Vs China 
 
(As % of GDP) 
 
  India  China 
Household consumption expenditure 
General government final consumption expenditure 
Gross capital formation 
Exports of goods and services 














Source: World Development Indicators 2008, World Bank. 
 
The rupee has been depreciating since January 2008 as a direct result of the huge 
reverse flow of capital out of India. From an average Rs. 40.36 per US dollar in 
March 2008 it fell to an average of Rs. 49.00 in November 2008, depreciation of 
about 18 per cent and further to nearly Rs 52 at the beginning of March 2009. This is 
a decline of 22 per cent over the same month in 2008.  Depreciation is good for Indian 
exports but it will have adverse effects on corporates who borrowed abroad and will 
raise the cost of external debt servicing. Outstanding commercial borrowing at end-
March 2008 had been US$ 62 billion (GOI, 2008). 
 
The direct impact of global crisis will be seen on India’s balance of payments in 
2008-09 (Table 4). Non-oil exports for the full year may not grow more than 7 per 
cent against 28 per cent in 2007-08 and non-oil imports 12 per cent against 33 per 




                                                 
9 The income multiplier is given by the formula: 1/1-c (1-t) +m where c=marginal propensity to 
consume, t=direct taxes as a proportion of GDP, m=imports as a proportion of GDP. With the 
assumption of a same tax ratio (say, 10 per cent), the income multiplier for India is 1.35 and China 
just below 1.    20
Table 4:  India's Balance of Payments: 2008-09 
(US$ million) 
 
   2006-07  2007-08  2008-09(P) 
Exports 128888  166163  175715 
Imports   190670  257789  291113 
Trade balance  -61782  -91626  -115398 
     % of GDP  -6.8  -7.8  -9.8 
Invisible receipts  114558  148604  173867 
Invisible payments  62341  74012  81413 
Invisibles, net  52217  74592  92453 
     % of GDP  5.7  6.4  7.8 
Current account  -9565  -17034  -22945 
     % of GDP  -1.0  -1.5  -1.9 
Capital account (net)  46171  109198  6500 
     % of GDP  5.1  9.3  0.6 
  -Foreign direct investment  7693  15401  18000 
  -Portfolio investment  7060  29556  -15000 
  -External commercial borrowings  16103  22633  5000 
  -Short-term trade credit  6612  17183  3000 
  -External assistance  1775  2114  2500 
  -NRI deposits  4321  179  3000 
  -Other banking capital  -2408  9349  -5000 
  -Other flows  5015  12783  -5000 
Change in Reserves (-increase. 
+decline) 
-36606 -92164  16445 
 
Note: Crude oil price at $82 per barrel in 2008-09 against $79 in 2007-08. 
 
Remittances are assumed to grow by 20 per cent against 41 per cent last year and 
software exports to rise by 15 per cent against 29 per cent last year. Crude oil price is 
envisaged to average US$ 82 per barrel against US$ 79 last year
10. On these 
assumptions, trade deficit will rise substantially and as a per cent of GDP is likely to 
be 9.8 per cent in 2008-09 against 7.8 per cent in 2007-08. Current account deficit 
will widen to 1.9 per cent of GDP in 2008-09 from 1.5 per cent in the previous year. 
 
On the capital account, there could be a nominal surplus of less than 1 per cent of 
GDP as compared to huge surpluses in earlier years.  Foreign reserves will be drawn 
down to the extent of US$ 16 billion (including valuation changes) against an 
accretion of US$ 92 billion last year. This will imply a change of more than $100 
billion or nearly 10% of GDP in the BOP comfort level of the economy. This may 
have an adverse impact on investor perception and also on our own ability to handle a 
further weakening of our service and merchandize exports. There is thus an urgent 
need for focusing on measures to push exports.  
                                                 
10 The average spot price of Brent and Dubai crude for April 2008 to January 2009 was US$ 89.6 per 
barrel and futures price for February and March are about US$ 44 per barrel.   21
5.  Policy Response to the Economic Slowdown 
 
5.1  Monetary Policy Measures 
 
Before the spread of the global crisis, rising inflation was one major downside risk for 
the Indian economy. But the fall of prices of oil and other commodities and overall 
fall in demand as a result of recession in major developed countries has pushed down 
the rate of inflation in India. Inflation measured by the wholesale price index (WPI) 
had peaked at 12.9 per cent in early August 2008 and has been coming down since 
then.  WPI inflation dropped to 4.4 per cent by 31
st January 2009 and just 2.4 per cent 
as on 28
th February 2009. Monetary policy shifted gear and became expansionary 
from October after the scale of the US financial sector meltdown and its likely 
adverse effects on the Indian economy became evident. The policy focus has shifted 
from containing inflation to promoting growth.  The RBI thus acted with considerable 
alacrity in infusing considerable liquidity in to the system. 
 
Falling inflation, a positive byproduct of global crisis, enabled the central bank to 
loosen monetary policy more aggressively. As indicated earlier, the RBI lowered the 
cash reserve ratio (CRR) requirements of banks from 9 per cent to 5 per cent, 
statutory reserve ratio (SLR) requirements from 25 per cent to 24 per cent and the 
repo rate (the rate at which it lends to banks overnight), from 9 per cent to 5 per cent 
and reverse repo rate (the rate at which RBI borrows from banks) from 6 per cent to 
3.5 per cent. It also opened a special window for banks for short-term funds for on-
lending to mutual funds, NBFC’s and housing finance companies. It has also started 
the buy-back of the market stabilization scheme (MSS) securities from mid-
November. RBI has opened a refinance facility to Small Industrial Development Bank 
of India (SIDBI), National Housing Bank (NHB) and EXIM Bank and a liquidity 
facility to NBFCs through a SPV. It also has opened a dollar swap arrangement for 
banks for their overseas operations. The actual or potential liquidity injection under 
all these measures has been estimated at Rs. 3,88,045 crore equivalent to over 7 per 
cent of GDP (Table 5). 
 
Table 5:  Actual/Potential Release of Primary Liquidity  
since Mid-September 2008 
(Rs. Crore) 
 
1  Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) Reduction  1,60,000 
2 MSS  Unwinding  63,045 
3  Term Repo Facility  60,000 
4  Increase in Export Credit Refinance  25,500 
5  Special Refinance Facility for SCBs (Non-RRB)  38,500 
6  Refinance Facility for SIDBI/NHB/EXIM Bank  16,000 
7  Liquidity Facility for NBFCs through SPV  25,000 
  Total (1 to 7)  3,88,045 
Memo: Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) Reduction  40,000 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
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This is indeed an impressive slew of monetary policy measures and shows that the 
RBI is both watchful and active. The present problem is that this additional liquidity 
seems to have either found its way into a build-up of bank deposits or been pre-
empted by government borrowing. There is hardly any evidence that it has been used 
for boosting either investment or consumption demand.  
 
The liquidity crisis and credit crunch felt in the economy from mid-September to 
October 2008 has turned into a situation of deep demand contraction for bank finance 
as the effects of global recession has spread to India. In fact the expansion of bank 
finance in January 2009 has been negative at Rs.11, 218 crore as against an expansion 
of Rs. 70,396 crore in the same month of 2008 (Fig. 18). In the last four months from 
November 2008 to February 2009, expansion of bank finance to the commercial 
sector has been just Rs. 60,862 crore as compared to Rs. 2,36,227 crore in the same 
period last year. This reflects a very soft investment sentiment in the economy which 
may persist in the coming months. 
 
Figure 18:  Expansion of Bank Finance to Commercial Sector (Rs. Crore) 
 










Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 
2007-08 2008-09
 
Note: Bank finance includes non-food credit, and investments in shares, debentures, 
bonds, commercial paper, etc. 
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
5.2  Fiscal Stimulus 
 
Due to the acuteness of the financial crisis and the ineffectiveness of monetary policy, 
governments across the world have announced various fiscal stimulus packages to 
counter the crisis. In terms of GDP, South African government has announced the 
biggest stimulus package that constitutes around 24 per cent of GDP (Fig. 19). The 
second biggest stimulus package has been announced by the Chinese government 
which constitutes 16.3 per cent of GDP with a total amount of around US$ 586 
billion. In absolute terms, the US fiscal stimulus is the largest with an amount of US$ 
787 billion. However, these fiscal numbers do not provide the real estimate of total 
stimulus as guarantees are not included in these calculations nor automatic stabilizers 
provided in certain countries. The Indian government’s fiscal package is small in 
magnitude constituting around 1.3 per cent of GDP for 2008-09. This seems to be 
quite small as compared to most of the countries. But as has been reiterated earlier 
there is less fiscal headroom in India which is already running a high public debt.   23
Figure 19:  Fiscal Stimulus as Per cent of GDP 
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          Source:  Gallagher, K.P (2009). 
 
6.  Growth Prospects for 2008-09 and 2009-10 
 
Index of Leading Indicators 
 
Given its implications for monetary and fiscal policy, GDP growth forecasting has 
become an important topic of research among economists. Various forecasting 
techniques, ranging from a relatively simple Bridge Model to highly complex 
structural econometric techniques such as Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) model are being used to predict future growth.  Though all the forecasting 
techniques have their respective advantages and disadvantages, one approach, which 
is known as the “Leading Indicators” method, has recently gained a significant 
acceptability among researchers. Leading economic indicators (LEI) are variables that 
are considered to have significant influence on the future level of economic activity in 
the country. These indicators give advance signals about the likely future growth rate. 
Generally they are used to identify inflexion points in the business cycles which can 
be done with some accuracy as the change in direction of the principal leading 
indicators would result in a similar directional change in the overall economic 
activity. The predictive quality of these indicators has given them the appellation of 
the “leading” indicators. Given its ability to predict GDP growth with high precision 
in the Indian case
11, we have used here the LEI method for forecasting the GDP 
growth for 2008-09 and 2009-10.  
 
For constructing the leading indicators index, the following nine indicators have been 
selected, after testing their correlation with and predictive quality for overall 
economic activity: (i) production of machinery and equipment, (ii) non-food credit, 
(iii) railway freight traffic; (iv) cement sales, (v) net sales of the corporate sector, (vi) 
                                                 
11 Using the LEI methodology we had predicted in November 2006 a growth of GDP at 9.2 per cent for 
2007-08. Most other agencies had predicted a lower growth rate of 8.5 per cent or less as against the 
actual growth rate of 9 per cent.   24
fuel and metal prices, (vii)) real rate of interest, (viii BSE sensex and (ix) exports 
growth. 
 
A composite index for the leading economic indicators has been constructed for the 
period 1997-2008 with the quarterly series of growth of these variables (except for the 
real rate of interest where the level, and not the growth, has been used) using the 
‘principal component index’ (PCI) method. The PCI method assigns weights to each 
component leading indicator by the iteration process based on its contribution to total 
variation in the composite index.  
 
It has been noted that leading indicators do not capture the impact of external shocks 
which may have direct and immediate impact on the economy. Examples  of such 
shocks are the IT bust in 2000-01 (Q3 2000-01 to Q2 2001-02), crop failure in 2002-
03 (Q2 to Q4 2002-03) and the recent US financial meltdown (starting with Q3 2008-
09 up to say, Q4 2009-10). The leading economic indicator index (LEI) with a 5-
quarter lag and   the shock represented by a dummy variable (equal to 1 with shock 
and 0 without) are used to forecast India’s GDP growth. The growth equation builds 
in the previous shocks of the dotcom bust and the agricultural failure and its estimates 
tracked the actual GDP performance very closely.  For projecting the GDP growth for 
2008-09 and 2009-10, the equation incorporates LEI index plus the current expected 
shock of the global financial meltdown. Fig. 20 brings together the LEI, the shock 
variable and the projected GDP growth. 
 
Figure 20:  Projection of Growth Rate through Index of Leading Indicators  




The estimated equation for GDP growth forecast, given below, is satisfactory with 
adjusted R-square value of 0.65 and all the co-efficients significant at 99 per cent 
level. 
 
GrGDPt = 7.98 + 1.34 LEIt-5   - 3.70 Dummy 
                                                             (4.70)            (-7.56) 
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The GDP forecast for 2008-09 and 2009-10 is tabulated below (Table 6) alternatively 
for three scenarios with the shock, without the shock and shock moderated by policy 
response. 
 
Table 6:  GDP Forecast for 2008-09 and 2009-10 
 











Using this three pronged calibrated approach we have derived three different forecasts 
for each of the two years. The scenario with ‘no shock’ which is considered as a case 
that would have been possible in the absence of the financial crisis, provides a growth 
of 7.9 per cent for the year 2008-09. For the year 2009-10 the growth without shock 
comes out around 8.4 per cent, which implies a recovery that would have been 
possible in the absence of the external crisis. The scenario ‘with shock’ has been 
calibrated for two cases. In the first case, the full impact of the shock has been taken 
into consideration whereas in the second case, the moderated shock impact has been 
considered. The first case of full impact of the shock gives a GDP growth of 6.3 per 
cent for 2008-09 and a much lower 4.8 per cent for 2009-10. The second case which 
takes into account the impact of both monetary and fiscal stimuli gives a growth of 
6.3 per cent in 2008-09 and 5.5 per cent in 2009-10. The impact of the stimulus 
packages will occur only in 2009-10 and it is too early to occur in 2008-09.  
 
It would be, therefore, realistic to say that the GDP growth rate for 2009-10 would be 
in the range of 4.8 to 5.5 per cent. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion and Policy Suggestions 
 
The Indian economy was on a cyclical slowdown after a five-year record boom and 
there was every hope that the economy will go for another strong growth phase after 
this brief slowdown. The global crisis has changed that outlook and instead will 
deepen and prolong Indian economy’s slowdown. It has dealt a severe blow to 
investment sentiments and consumer confidence in the economy. The policy response 
so far has been prompt in the form of monetary easing and fiscal expansion but the 
impact may not be much in the near term. A major worry is the severe weakening of 
India’s fiscal position and balance of payments during this crisis period. The basic 
question is how long it will take to revive the investment and consumer demand 
which are falling precipitously. 
 
Fiscal and monetary expansionary steps at a time of extreme uncertainty worldwide 
will have limited impact. On the other hand, the sharp reversal of the steady fiscal 
improvement over the past five years or so would weaken public finances 
considerably and store up problems for the economy sooner than later. The objective 
of economic policy must be to maximize on gains from global integration while 
causing a reduction in poverty and inequities. Therefore, a better way of responding to 
the crisis is the often repeated and now become cliché of kick-starting the ‘second   26
round of reforms’ which is long overdue. India has to substantially relax its “permit 
and approval” system by carrying out procedural reforms which will raise the 
investment climate for both domestic and foreign investment. It should reform its 
education system at school and university levels. It should carry out reforms in 
agriculture in its various stages; from input to output to marketing. The government 
should press hard in changing policies and procedures to build world class 
infrastructure of power, roads, ports, airports, urban infrastructure, water and 
sanitation. India ranks very low among countries on regulatory environment with 
regard to enforcement of contracts, payment of taxes, business closure, licensing, 
property registration and setting up of business (World Bank, 2008). Reforms in these 
areas would be much more effective than just packages of monetary and fiscal stimuli 
to restore investor and consumer confidence. 
 
The real challenge for Indian policy makers and India Inc is however to try and raise 
the share of India’s exports in major markets and product segments. It is really 
ironical that India’s share in world trade is lower than the level as in 1950!! This is 
not tenable any longer if we have to achieve rapid growth with equity. Exports have 
the desirable characteristic of being relatively labor intensive. This is especially true 
of services exports that include a wide range of exports such as software, tourist 
earnings, films, accountancy, legal services etc. On the other hand, there is hardly 
reason for our textile and garment exports to loose grounds, as they have been doing, 
to Bangladesh, Vietnam and other such smaller economies when we still have such a 
large pool of unemployed human resources. For pushing both services and labour 
intensive manufactured exports, the policy makers must pay much greater attention to 
labour market reforms on the one hand and to development of vocational skills on the 
other. Overall, it is important to emphasize that while fiscal and monetary stimuli may 
provide the much needed short term palliatives for shoring up the GDP growth, the 
real push will only come from implementing structural reforms, the agenda for which 
has really been put on the shelf for a while. We cannot hope to generate the needed 
economic activity or the employment levels by continuing to tinker around with the 
economy. Bold and visionary measures, such as those undertaken in the early nineties, 
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